CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Decided June 8, 2023 - Dubin v. United States, 22-10.

In this case, petitioner, David Dubin, was convicted of healthcare fraud for overbilling Medicaid for psychological testing. The question at hand was whether his actions also constituted aggravated identity theft under §1028A(a)(1) of the United States Code. Section 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses a means of identification of another person without lawful authority during and in relation to a predicate offense, such as healthcare fraud. The Government argued that Dubin's fraudulent Medicaid billing, which included the patient's Medicaid reimbursement number, constituted the use of a means of identification.

The District Court, bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, allowed Dubin's conviction for aggravated identity theft to stand, even though it viewed the crux of the case as fraudulent billing rather than identity theft. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed the decision in a fractured manner, with five concurring judges acknowledging that the elements of the offense were not captured or fairly described by the term "identity theft." 

The key issue in this case revolves around the interpretation of two elements of §1028A(a)(1): the "use" of another person's means of identification and the use being "in relation to" the predicate offense of healthcare fraud. The Government argued that a defendant "uses" a means of identification "in relation to" a predicate offense when that means of identification is employed to facilitate or further the predicate offense in some way. Essentially, they claimed that Dubin's use of the patient's Medicaid reimbursement number in the fraudulent billing constituted such use.

The Supreme Court's decision in this case, known as the holding, states that under §1028A(a)(1), a defendant "uses" another person's means of identification "in relation to" a predicate offense when that use is at the crux of what makes the conduct criminal. The Court's analysis of the case spans from page 4 to page 21, delving into the interpretation of the relevant statutory language, the intent of Congress in enacting the law, and the importance of giving effect to the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. Ultimately, the Court concluded that for Dubin to be convicted of aggravated identity theft, his use of the patient's means of identification must be  central to the criminal conduct, which, in this case, is the fraudulent billing itself.

This decision narrows the interpretation of §1028A(a)(1) and establishes that the use of another person's means of identification must be more than incidental or peripheral to the primary offense; it must be an integral part of the criminal conduct. The analysis continues with a discussion of the terms "uses" and "in relation to" in §1028A(a)(1) and their sensitivity to context. The Court acknowledges that these terms have different meanings depending on the context in which they are used. The Court cites a previous decision, Bailey v. United States, which emphasized that the term "use" implies action and implementation, but its specific meaning is determined by the context of the statute. Similarly, the phrase "in relation to" indicates a relationship or nexus of some kind, but the nature and strength of that relationship depend on the context.

In interpreting §1028A(a)(1), the Court considers the specific language, structure, and purpose of the provision. It notes that a broad interpretation, where any inclusion of a name or means of identification in a payment or billing method automatically triggers the application of §1028A(a)(1), would encompass a wide range of offenses. However, a more targeted reading, advocated by Dubin, requires that the use of a means of identification be genuinely connected to the predicate offense, particularly when fraud or deceit is involved. The Court emphasizes that the title and terms of §1028A(a)(1) support a narrower interpretation that aligns with the ordinary understanding of identity theft, where the misuse of a means of identification is central to the criminal act.

Overall, the Court's analysis points towards a more limited interpretation of §1028A(a)(1), which requires a genuine nexus between the use of a means of identification and the predicate offense, especially when the underlying crime involves fraud or deceit. The Court emphasizes the importance of considering the context and purpose of the provision in determining its intended meaning. The Court continues its analysis by focusing on the title of Section 1028A and its significance in interpreting the provision. It argue that the title, "Aggravated identity theft," indicates that identity theft is central to the provision's purpose. The Court notes that a statute's title has been recognized as a tool for understanding its meaning and resolving ambiguities.

In this case, Section 1028A's title is particularly valuable because it is focused and distinct, not summarizing a long list of provisions. The Court asserts that the title reinforces what the text of the provision suggests independently. It contrasts Section 1028A's targeted title with the broader title of a neighboring provision, Section 1028, which encompasses fraud involving means of identification.  The Court addresses the government's argument to disregard the title of Section 1028A, asserting that the government's broad reading of the provision would encompass ordinary overbilling offenses as core identity theft crimes. Instead, the Court argues that "identity theft" has a more specific meaning, referring to the fraudulent appropriation and use of another person's identifying data or documents. This understanding supports the interpretation that the use of the means of identification must be at the crux of the underlying crime for it to qualify as identity theft.

The Court also highlights that the inclusion of "aggravated" in the provision's title suggests that Congress intended to address a particularly serious form of identity theft, rather than encompassing all forms of everyday overbilling offenses. 

In summary, the Court concluded that the title of Section 1028A, along with the ordinary understanding of identity theft, supports a narrower interpretation of the provision where the use of a means of identification is central to the criminal conduct. This interpretation aligns with the purpose and focus of Section 1028A as a standalone provision addressing aggravated identity theft.

The Court further examined the language of Section 1028A(a)(1) and argued that it aligns with the title and supports a narrower interpretation. Congress used a trio of verbs in the provision—"transfers, possesses, or uses"—which reflect an ordinary understanding of identity theft. The verbs "transfers" and "possesses" are naturally read in the context of identity theft, suggesting the theft of a means of identification belonging to another person. The interpretative canon of noscitur a sociis, which states that a word is known by the company it keeps, indicates that "uses" should be understood in a similar manner as "transfers" and "possesses" in the context of identity theft. The Court assumes that Congress intentionally used these three terms with distinct meanings. The Court argued that a more targeted reading of the three verbs captures the complexity of identity theft, which involves elements of theft, fraud, misappropriation, and deceitful use. If "uses" is not read in this narrow manner, it risks being rendered without any substantial function.

The Court also raised concerns about the broad reading of Section 1028A(a)(1) in relation to the list of predicate offenses. The enhancement provided by the provision imposes a severe mandatory prison sentence onto underlying offenses that may not have any mandatory prison sentence at all. The broad reading fails to distinguish between the specific crime of aggravated identity theft and other offenses. The Court suggests that the enhancement was intended for situations where the means of identification itself is central to the criminality, rather than being a mere ancillary feature.  Furthermore, the Court emphasizes the need for restraint when interpreting federal criminal statutes and avoiding reading incongruous breadth into vague language. It argues that the government's broad reading of Section 1028A(a)(1), which would encompass everyday overbilling cases, is implausible and goes against the Court's traditional approach. The Court cannot rely on the assumption that the government will use the statute responsibly, highlighting the importance of interpreting the statute based on its actual language and intent.

In conclusion, the Court found that the language, title, and structure of Section 1028A(a)(1) supports a narrower interpretation that focuses on identity theft as the core of the provision, rather than encompassing a wide range of offenses involving means of identification. 

The Court vacates and remands the case for further proceedings.

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